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Comment: WYSIATI and False 
Confessions  
Michael R. Hoernlein 
Truth is tough. It will not break like a bubble, at a touch; nay, 
you may kick it all day like a football, and it will be round 
and full at evening. – Oliver Wendell Holmes, Sr.  
INTRODUCTION 
Decades after the Supreme Court mandated in Miranda v. 
Arizona1 that police advise suspects of their constitutional 
rights before custodial interrogation, confusion remains about 
the contours of the rule, and some law enforcement officers still 
try to game the system. In his excellent Note, “No Earlier 
Confession to Repeat”: Seibert, Dixon, and Question-First 
Interrogations, Lee Brett presents a careful analysis of the legal 
landscape applicable to so-called question-first interrogations. 
Mr. Brett offers a compelling argument urging courts not to 
interpret Bobby v. Dixon2 as limiting the application of Missouri 
v. Seibert3 to two-step (i.e., question-first) interrogations only 
when there’s an “earlier confession to repeat.”  
Mr. Brett does an excellent job explaining and analyzing 
Dixon, Seibert, and how they fit into the Miranda framework. 
The Supreme Court should, as Mr. Brett suggests, step in to 
provide much-needed clarity for lower courts and law 
enforcement. Until then, defense lawyers should continue to 
challenge midstream warnings.  
I’m a little biased about this topic: I was one of the lawyers 
representing Bobby Johnson in petitioning the United States 
 
 1. 384 U.S. 436 (1966). 
 2. 565 U.S. 23 (2011) (per curiam). 
 3. 542 U.S. 600 (2004). 
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Supreme Court to review his case, which was the backdrop for 
Mr. Brett’s Note.4 Mr. Brett has done such an outstanding job 
that there’s not much left for me to say about those legal issues. 
So, I’d like to use this opportunity to explore false confessions 
and how the field of behavioral economics—specifically, the 
phenomenon that psychologist Daniel Kahneman dubs 
WYSIATI (What You See Is All There Is)—can help explain false 
confessions and the convictions they produce.  
I. FALSE CONFESSIONS 
I’ve watched the video of Bobby Johnson’s interrogation 
many times. Not only do I believe that the detectives 
deliberately flouted Miranda and Seibert when they questioned 
Mr. Johnson, but I also believe that they elicited a false 
confession. 
The Fifth Amendment’s right against self-incrimination 
wasn’t rooted in a concern for ensuring reliability or protecting 
innocent people from making false confessions; it was first and 
foremost intended to protect the integrity of a person’s free will 
against government intrusion. Over time, regard for the 
reliability of confessions grew as a factor in how courts 
understood the Fifth Amendment. Courts have recognized for 
some time that a suspect might falsely confess to a crime. For 
example, the Supreme Court noted in Miranda that 
“[i]nterrogation procedures may even give rise to a false 
confession.”5 
In recent years, the proliferation of true-crime 
documentaries, movies, tv shows, and podcasts have shone a 
spotlight on the prevalence of false confessions.6 As more and 
more police departments across the country have started 
recording interrogations on video, we’ve had unprecedented 
 
 4. See generally Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Johnson v. North 
Carolina, 140 S. Ct. 122 (2019) (No. 18-1542). 
 5. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 455 n.24. 
 6. See, e.g., PARADISE LOST: THE CHILD MURDERS AT ROBIN HOOD HILLS 
(Home Box Office 1996), THE CENTRAL PARK FIVE (Sundance Selects 2012), 
Making a Murderer (Synthesis Films 2015), The Confession Tapes (A24 2017), 
When They See Us (Harpo Films 2019), and The Innocent Man (Campfire 
2018).   
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visibility into what happens in interrogation rooms before 
suspects incriminate themselves. And as DNA evidence has led 
to exonerations of many wrongfully convicted defendants, it’s 
become impossible to ignore the role that false confessions can 
play in sending the wrong people to prison.  
The jury is no longer out (so to speak): Under the right 
conditions, psychologically coercive interrogations can lead 
innocent people to lie about committing crimes in which they 
didn’t participate at all—sometimes terrible, almost 
unimaginable, crimes. Still, it remains very difficult for the 
average person to accept that a suspect would implicate himself 
in a crime that he had nothing to do with—which makes it a 
particularly fascinating phenomenon.  
And a tragic one: Often the suspects who falsely confess are 
just children or have some form of emotional or intellectual 
deficit. In some of the more outrageous cases, police and 
prosecutors secured convictions of not just one innocent person 
but multiple innocent people—usually with no physical 
evidence tying any of them to the crime. Their nicknames have 
become synonymous with wrongful convictions based on false 
convictions: The West Memphis Three, the Norfolk Four, the 
Central Park Five, the Beatrice Six.  
Sometimes, interrogations are so effective—not at getting 
at the truth but at manipulating the suspect—that suspects 
start to believe that they must have committed the crime. They 
might even develop false memories through repeated, 
manipulative interrogation sessions. 
Fortunately, DNA evidence occasionally proves the true 
perpetrator’s identity and exonerates the wrongfully convicted. 
But when faced with contrary physical evidence, prosecutors 
often change their theory to account for a new suspect: Sure the 
guy whose DNA is all over the scene was obviously involved, but 
that doesn’t mean all the others were innocent. They just 
managed to avoid leaving any trace. The prosecutors modify 
their narrative to incorporate the new evidence without revising 
their underlying theory, which usually requires some creative—
or fanciful—speculation. That resistance to admitting the 
mistake and getting the justice train back on the tracks can rob 
the wrongfully accused of many additional years of freedom. 
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False confessions tend to reflect common themes: 
questioning that goes on for hours in a small, strategically 
arranged room with no window; an isolated suspect with a poor 
understanding of his rights; interrogators who get in the 
suspect’s face, accuse him relentlessly of having committed the 
crime, lie about the available evidence, threaten him with a long 
prison sentence or death, offer to put in a good word with the 
district attorney, and suggest possible explanations for the 
crime to minimize the suspect’s culpability. That’s no 
coincidence—that’s the playbook. The goal isn’t to gather 
information: since the questioner already believes that the 
suspect is guilty, the goal is to wear down the suspect until he 
confesses.  
II. WYSIATI 
There’s an extensive (and increasingly sophisticated) body 
of scholarship on the factors that contribute to false confessions. 
The field of behavioral economics offers useful principles for 
making sense of such confessions. 
One key concept that sheds light on the dynamics of false 
confessions is WYSIATI, a term that psychologist and Nobel 
Prize winner Daniel Kahneman coined in his breakthrough 
book Thinking, Fast and Slow.7 WYSIATI is a powerful feature 
of human psychology that often leads people to jump to incorrect 
conclusions. It can lead investigators away from the truth, make 
false confessions more likely, and induce a judge or jury to 
embrace a false narrative that conflicts with other available 
evidence. 
An understanding of WYSIATI requires a brief introduction 
to Kahneman’s project. Kahneman illuminates the mechanisms 
of human judgment and decision making using the framework 
of what psychologists refer to as System 1 (the part of the mind 
that “operates automatically and quickly, with little or no effort 
and no sense of voluntary control”)8 and System 2 (the slower, 
 
 7. See DANIEL KAHNEMAN, THINKING, FAST AND SLOW 86 (2011). 
 8. Id. at 20. 
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deliberative part that handles more “effortful mental 
activities”).9   
Navigating our complex world requires us to think fast. We 
can’t analyze everything that confronts us in our day-to-day 
lives. Simple tasks would quickly overwhelm us. System 1 
facilitates daily life by generating automatic impressions and 
intuitions that allow us to make sense of the world around us 
and that, in general, serve as a sound basis for belief and action. 
As Kahneman explains, System 1 allows us to do things like 
compute 2 + 2, read a billboard, detect anger in someone’s voice, 
think of Paris when someone mentions the capital of France. 
Those come to us automatically—in fact, it’s almost impossible 
to shield ourselves from the immediate impressions that arise 
when we encounter the expression “2 + 2”, a billboard, an angry 
voice, or mention of the capital of France. 
Sometimes, though, we need to engage the slower System 2 
for heavier mental lifting. System 2 takes care of a wide variety 
of attention-intensive tasks, like multiplying 13 by 27, focusing 
on a particular voice in a noisy room, filling out a tax form, or 
telling someone our phone number. Those tasks are not 
automatic—they require effort.   
System 1 turns out to be prone to specific kinds of 
systematic errors. And one key aspect of System 1 is that it 
“excels at constructing the best possible story that incorporates 
ideas currently activated [in associative memory], but it does 
not (and cannot) allow for information it does not have.”10 In 
other words, WYSIATI is System 1’s tendency to “jump[] to 
conclusions on the basis of limited evidence.”11 
To illustrate how WYSIATI works, Kahneman offers an 
example: “‘Will Mindik be a good leader? She is intelligent and 
strong . . . .’ An answer quickly came to your mind, and it was 
yes. You picked the best answer based on the very limited 
information available, but you jumped the gun. What if the next 
two adjectives were corrupt and cruel?”12 
 
 9. Id. at 21. 
 10. Id. at 85. 
 11. Id. at 86. 
 12. Id. at 85. 
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With the first two bits of information about Mindik (that 
she’s intelligent and strong), most people can’t help but think of 
an answer instead of withholding judgment until more 
information becomes available. Although the answer might 
change as we learn more about Mindik (and even if we’re aware 
that we have limited information), there’s a bias in favor of 
accepting System 1’s initial impression.  
As Kahneman puts it, “The measure of success for System 
1 is the coherence of the story it manages to create. The amount 
and quality of the data on which the story is based are largely 
irrelevant.”13 That statement goes a long way toward explaining 
how people think.   
It’s easier to connect fewer dots than more dots. So, the less 
information we have, the easier it is to construct a story with 
narrative integrity. But coherence alone shouldn’t be enough for 
us—we want to be right. We want the truth. And a narrative 
that not only has internal coherence but is also true will be able 
to accommodate any reliable evidence that it runs up against. 
As Justice Holmes’s father noted, “Truth is tough. It will not 
break, like a bubble, at a touch; nay, you may kick it about all 
day, like a football, and it will be round and full at evening.”14 
When investigators and prosecutors try to shield their narrative 
from additional evidence, fearing that it might “break . . . like a 
bubble,” it’s a major red flag.   
Those initial impressions and intuitions that arise in the 
early stages of a case can impede efforts to uncover the truth, 
since System 1 is “radically insensitive to both the quality and 
the quantity of the information that gives rise to impressions 
and intuitions.”15  
WYSIATI also helps explain many cognitive biases that can 
lead us away from the truth and toward an “alternative” version 




 13. Id.  
 14. OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, THE PROFESSOR AT THE BREAKFAST TABLE 
109 (1859). 
 15. KAHNEMAN, supra note 7, at 86. 
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overconfidence faith in intuition, blindness to missing 
information, “fed by the illusory 
certainty of hindsight”16 
framing effects being swayed by the way information is 
presented to us 
confirmation bias seeking (or crediting) evidence that 
supports a preexisting view and 
ignoring (or discounting) contrary 
evidence 
availability bias magnifying more recent or more 
memorable events or information 
These biases (and others) operate on us even when we know 
that we’re susceptible to them.  
III. WYSIATI AND INVESTIGATORS 
It’s not hard to see how WYSIATI and cognitive biases can 
infect investigations. An investigation is an iterative process of 
acquiring knowledge. It requires gathering and analyzing 
evidence over time, usually beginning with a limited set of 
information or allegations. 
Impressions and intuitions can be helpful—especially if 
they’re based on extensive experience—but they’re no substitute 
for careful evaluation of evidence by System 2.  
From an investigation’s inception, the investigator’s mind 
automatically starts crafting a coherent narrative using the 
limited information available. System 1 doesn’t wait until 
there’s enough evidence that’s adequately tested for reliability. 
It synthesizes whatever’s available—no matter how meager or 
unreliable—and constructs the best narrative that it can 
without regard to all the unknowns. WYSIATI kicks in even 
though the investigator is missing pieces and knows it. Again, 
System 1 is “radically insensitive to both the quality and the 
quantity of [available] information.”17 
The danger is in allowing those initial impressions and 
intuitions from System 1 to harden into conclusions 
prematurely; jumping to conclusions can steer an investigation 
 
 16. Id. at 14. 
 17. Id. at 86. 
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in the wrong direction. The seed of many wrongful convictions 
is planted when inept investigators “go with their gut.” A 
detective might think, The husband did it. He’s acting 
suspicious. There was no sign of forced entry. And the couple had 
been arguing in recent days. I’ve seen this a hundred times. That 
seed might then get fertilized (so to speak) with some junk 
science, questionable eyewitnesses, creative speculation . . . and 
on and on. 
Good investigators have a well-developed System 2 that 
doesn’t just rubberstamp System 1. They methodically assess 
the available evidence, look for new evidence, reevaluate the 
situation, test their hypotheses periodically, and remain willing 
to scrap a theory that is too fragile when new facts are injected.  
Bad investigators, on the other hand, get hung up on initial 
impressions, seek out information that supports their preferred 
narrative, ignore contrary evidence, and use speculation to fill 
in gaps and resolve apparent inconsistencies.   
IV. WYSIATI AND SUSPECTS 
During an interrogation of a suspect believed to be guilty, 
an investigator who is determined to extract a confession can 
use WYSIATI against the suspect. The interrogator isolates the 
suspect in the interrogation room, cutting off his access to 
information. The interrogator selectively highlights facts about 
the crime. The interrogator supplements the facts with lies 
(“your buddy says you pulled the trigger,” or “your prints were 
all over the knife,” or “you failed the polygraph test.”).  
With those cherry-picked ideas active in associative 
memory—without regard to the quality of the information—the 
suspect’s System 1 generates impressions of the suspect’s 
situation, leaving it to System 2 to sort everything out and lead 
the suspect to a conclusion about what to do. 
As the interrogation drags on, the suspect’s stress level 
skyrockets and fatigue sets in. The suspect’s System 2 falters 
and produces a twisted cost-benefit analysis: They don’t believe 
me. They’ll never believe me. They have evidence that will convict 
me. I want to get out of here now. I’m better off giving them what 
they want. Since I know I didn’t do it, they’ll realize it too before 
this goes too far.   
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V. WYSIATI AND JURORS 
Fast forward to the jury trial. The judge will tell the jury 
that the indictment is just a set of allegations, that the 
defendant is innocent until proven guilty, that the government 
has the burden of convincing the jury of the defendant’s guilt 
beyond a reasonable doubt.  
But what data points are available to the jury? As the trial 
begins, all the jurors know is that the government charged this 
defendant with committing that crime. What they see is all 
there is. In the absence of any other information, each juror’s 
System 1 says, “He probably did it.” It’s up to System 2 to say, 
“Not so fast. We don’t have any evidence yet.”  
Before and during trial, the defense and the prosecution 
will fight over what evidence the judge should allow to come in 
and what evidence should be excluded. For example, in Bobby 
Johnson’s case, the defense was unsuccessful at excluding the 
post-Miranda interrogation. On the other hand, the prosecution 
successfully excluded the pre-Miranda portion of the 
interrogation. The jury only saw part of the video and didn’t see 
the first four or five hours, in which Bobby denied any 
involvement, cried, and banged his head on the table.  
The rules of evidence include very blunt tools for judges to 
control the information flow to the jury. If a false confession is 
introduced, it’s pretty much game over. Judges and juries give 
confessions tremendous weight, often to the complete exclusion 
of everything else. Many exonerees were convicted based on 
confessions where no physical evidence implicated them. Even 
a confession that is totally implausible, that includes 
inconsistent claims, that flies in the face of physical evidence—
including DNA evidence—can be hard for juries to discount.   
CONCLUSION 
We can’t shut System 1 off at will. But if we care about the 
truth, we can temper System 1’s effects with a robust sense of 
humility. We should be self-aware about the limits of our ability 
to acquire knowledge and about our susceptibility to cognitive 
biases. And we should recognize our fallibility and our tendency 
to be led astray. 
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Defendants in criminal cases have important protections in 
this country. Some are enshrined explicitly in the Bill of Rights: 
the right against self-incrimination, right to confront witnesses, 
right to trial by an impartial jury, right to counsel. Some are 
implicit, like the presumption of innocence and the 
reasonable-doubt standard.  
But those safeguards can be effective only if we understand 
and apply them in a way that accounts for what we know about 
how people actually think. Legislators at the state and federal 
level should continue seeking ways to update our laws to reflect 
the current state of scientific knowledge. Courts should 
calibrate procedural rules and individual rulings—for example, 
on evidentiary questions and jury instructions—to how people 
actually form judgments and make decisions in the real world. 
And prosecutors and police should foster cultures of humility, 
flexibility, and accountability to guard against securing and 
relying on false confessions.  
 
